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ON THE OCCASION OF THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY 
OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: 
PERSISTENT WHITE SUPREMACY, RELENTLESS 
ANTI-BLACKNESS, AND THE LIMITS OF THE LAW 
 
Nancy A. Heitzeg, Ph.D.1 
 
PART I. INTRODUCTION 
 
White supremacy - once writ large in the law via slavery and 
Jim Crow segregation – was removed from its legalized pedestal with 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, The Voting Rights Act of 1965 and 
finally, The Fair Housing Act of 1968.2 The law became “race-
neutral” and it now suddenly was illegal to discriminate on the basis 
on race – in housing, employment, public accommodations and 
access to the franchise. Advocates hoped that this legislation would 
finally bring to fruition the overdue promise of the Civil War 
Amendments, long subverted via both legislation and judicial 
interpretation.3 
These strokes of the pen, of course, could not remove bigotry 
long steeped in racist archetypes; nor could this legislation remove 
                                                 
1 Dr. Nancy A. Heitzeg is a Professor of Sociology and Director of the 
interdisciplinary Critical Studies of Race/Ethnicity Program at St. Catherine 
University, St. Paul, MN. Professor Heitzeg has written and presented widely on 
issues of race, class, gender, and social control with particular attention to the 
color-blind racism, the prison industrial complex, and the school to prison pipeline. 
For the past four years, Professor Heitzeg has also been co- editor of an on-line 
blog series, Criminal InJustice, which is devoted to encouraging public education, 
dialogue, and action on issues of mass criminalization and incarceration. 
2 JOE FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA: ROOTS, REALITIES, AND FUTURE 
REPARATIONS (2nd ed. 2010) [hereinafter FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA]; JOE 
FEAGIN, THE WHITE RACIAL FRAME: CENTURIES OF RACIAL FRAMING AND 
COUNTER-FRAMING (2nd Ed. 2013) [hereinafter FEAGIN, THE WHITE RACIAL 
FRAME]. 
3 DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL 
JUSTICE  (1987) 
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the structural barriers of nearly 400 years of white racial preference 
and cumulative advantage in the accumulation of wealth and 
property, access to education and housing, health and well-being, and 
all matter of social opportunities.4 Racism, as both white 
supremacist/anti-black ideology and institutionalized arrangement, 
remains merely transformed with its systemic foundations intact. 
Segregation in housing and education persists at levels beyond that 
noted in Brown v. Board of Education, racial wealth gaps grow, and 
racial disparities in criminal injustice proliferate at a pace that has led 
to the label “The New Jim Crow”. 5 
In tragic irony, the Civil Rights Act’s requirement of race-
neutrality has perhaps ushered in an era of more insidious de facto 
discrimination that is now denied through “color-blind” rhetoric. A 
large body of research documents the paradigmatic shift from overt 
essentialist racism to color-blindness.6 This style of racism relies 
heavily on ideological frames and linguistic shifts which allow 
whites to assert they “do not see race,” deny structural racism, claim 
a level playing field that now victimizes them with “reverse 
discrimination” and appeals to the “race card,” and argue that any 
discussion of race/racism is, in fact, racist and only serves to foment 
divisions rather than reflect/redress societal realities. “Color-blind 
racism” also creates a set of code terms that implicitly indict people 
of color without ever mentioning race.7 
In the Post-Civil Rights Era, the color-blind paradigm has 
become deeply ensconced in law and politics. Continued movement 
towards “race-neutrality” is the hallmark of a series of Supreme 
Court decisions that deny the role of institutionalized racism and 
increasingly limit the role of race in constitutional remedies for 
inequality in matters of affirmative action and educational access, 
                                                 
4 DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V THE BOARD OF EDUCATION AND 
THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM. (2004). 
5 EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM 
AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES (3rd ed. 
2013); EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, WHITE SUPREMACY AND RACISM IN THE POST-
CIVIL RIGHTS ERA (2001). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
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voting rights, and all matters of criminal injustice.8 Criminal justice 
– as it did post- Reconstruction – continues to play a central role in 
the continued subjugation of Blacks, in particular, and will serve as 
the central example of both past and current patterns of 
discrimination. 
On the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the passage of the 
Civil Rights Act, we must again raise questions about its ultimate 
impact on racial justice. While this legislation made a substantial 
contribution to effectively dislodging white supremacy from the law, 
the call instead to race-neutrality left anti-blackness unchallenged. 
The result, buttressed by judicial interpretations that further limit the 
consideration of race and the proliferation of color-blind rhetoric 
throughout popular and political discourse, has resulted in a situation 
of continued subjugation, particularly through the criminal justice 
system. One must ask – given Constitutional history, Supreme Court 
rulings that grind at a snail’s pace from the legitimation of slavery 
and exclusion to segregation to no consideration, and legislative 
lethargy – what are the pathways towards racial redress and equal 
protection of the law? 
 
PART II. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT IN HISTORICAL 
AND LEGAL CONTEXT 
 
An analysis of the “success” of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
must be centered in a larger discussion of the role of law generally in 
shaping our constructions of race. The theoretical perspective of 
Critical Race Theory (CRT), supplemented with the data of the social 
sciences, guides the analysis here. CRT, from the outset, raised 
crucial questions as to the ability of law to produce racial equality. In 
fact, CRT is grounded in “an analysis of how law helped constitute 
the very racial structure that antidiscrimination law aimed to 
                                                 
8 Univ. Of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U. S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Fisher v. Univ. of Texas 
at Austin, 133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013); Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013); 
McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
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regulate.”9 CRT proceeds from the premise that racial privilege and 
related oppression is deeply rooted in both our history and law, thus 
making as racism a “normal and ingrained feature of our 
landscape”;10 CRT further offers a critique of Civil Rights legal 
reforms in specific, by noting that these have failed to fundamentally 
challenge racial inequality. As Bell observes, “the subordination of 
blacks seems to reassure whites of an unspoken, but no less certain, 
property right in their whiteness.” 11 
While all communities of color suffer from racism in general 
and its manifestation in criminal justice in particular, “Black” has 
been the literal and figurative counterpart of “white”. Anti-black 
racism is arguably at the very foundation of white supremacy; the 
two constitute the foundational book-ends for the legal, political and 
every day constructions of race in the United States.12  For this 
reason, in combination with the excessive over-representation of 
African Americans in the criminal justice system and the prison 
industrial complex, this analysis will largely focus on the ways in 
which the law has been a tool for the oppression of African 
Americans via the furtherance of white supremacy and anti-
blackness in both law and practice. 
While race has never reflected any biological reality, it is 
indeed a powerful social and political construct. In the U.S. and 
elsewhere, it has served to delineate “whiteness” as the “unraced” 
norm – the “unmarked marker” – while hierarchically devaluing 
“other” racial/ethnic categories with Blackness always as the anti- 
thesis.13 The socio-political construction of race coincides with the 
age of exploration, the rise of “scientific” classification schemes, and 
perhaps most significantly capitalism. In the United States, the 
solidification of racial hierarchies cannot be disentangled from the 
                                                 
9 Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking 
Back To Move Forward, 43 CONN. L. REV. 5 (2011). 
10 Derrick Bell, After We’re Gone: Prudent Speculations on America in a Post-
Racial Epoch in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 2-8 (R. Delgado & 
J. Stefanic, eds., 2000). 
11 Id. 
12 FEAGIN, THE WHITE RACIAL FRAME, supra note 2. 
13 RUTH FRANKENBERG, WHITE WOMEN, RACE MATTERS (1992). 
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capitalist demands for “unfree” labor and expanded private property. 
By the late 1600s, race had been a marker for either free citizens or 
slave property, and colonial laws had reified this decades before the 
Revolutionary War.14 The question of slavery was at the center of 
debates in the creation of the United States and is referenced no less 
than ten times.15 By the time of the Constitutional Convention of 
1787, the racial lines defining slave and free had already been rigidly 
drawn – white was “free” and black was “slave” – and the result 
according to Douglass was this: “assume the Constitution to be what 
we have briefly attempted to prove it to be, radically and essentially 
pro-slavery”.16 The Three-Fifths Clause, the restriction on future 
bans of the slave trade and limits on the possibility of emancipation 
through escape were all clear indications of the significance of 
slavery to the Founders. The legal enouncement of slavery in the 
Constitution is one of the first of many “racial sacrifice covenants” 
to come, where the interests of Blacks were sacrificed for the nation. 
17 
The social and constitutional construction of white as free and 
Black as slave has on-going political and economic ramifications. 
According to Harris, whiteness not only allows access to property, 
may be conceived of per se as “whiteness as property”.18 These 
property rights produce both tangible and intangible value to those 
who possess it; whiteness as property includes the right to profit and 
to exclude, even the perceived right to kill in defense of the borders 
of whiteness.19 As Harris notes: 
 
The concept of whiteness was premised on white 
supremacy rather than mere difference. “White” was 
defined and constructed in ways that increased its 
value by reinforcing its exclusivity. Indeed, just as 
                                                 
14 FEAGIN, THE WHITE RACIAL FRAME, supra note 2, at 32-33. 
15 Bell, supra note 3, at 4. 
16 FREDERICK DOUGLASS, THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS: 
VOLUME 4, RECONSTRUCTION AND AFTER (Philip S. Foner ed., 1955). 
17 Bell, supra note 4, at 6. 
18 Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 8, 1707-91 (1993). 
19 Id. 
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whiteness as property embraced the right to exclude, 
whiteness as a theoretical construct evolved for the 
very purpose of racial exclusion. Thus, the concept 
of whiteness is built on both exclusion and racial 
subjugation. This fact was particularly evident 
during the period of the most rigid racial exclusion, 
as whiteness signified racial privilege and took the 
form of status property.20 
 
Conversely, Blackness is defined as outside of the margins of 
humanity as chattel rather than persons, and defined outside of the 
margins of civil society.  Frank Wilderson, in “The Prison Slave as 
Hegemonys (Silent) Scandal,” describes it like this: “Blackness in 
America generates no categories for the chromosome of history, and 
no data for the categories of immigration or sovereignty. It is an 
experience without analog — a past without a heritage.”21 Directly 
condemned by the Constitution in ways that other once excluded 
groups (American Indians, women, immigrants, LGBTQ) were not, 
Blackness as marked by slavery– as property not person - creates an 
outsider status that makes future inclusion a daunting challenge.22 
Any doubts as to the centrality of white supremacy built on 
anti-blackness were erased in the case of Scot v. Sanford (1857), 
where a majority of the Supreme Court denied the citizenship claims 
of Dred Scott and went further to declare that The Missouri 
Compromise requirement of balance between free and slave states in 
the expanding United States was a violation of the due process rights 
of slave holders.23 Referring to the legal status of African Americans, 
Justice Taney’s opinion for the majority makes it painfully clear, 
 
                                                 
20 Id. 
21 Frank Wilderson. The Prison Slave as Hegemony’s (Silent) Scandal, 30 SOCIAL 
JUSTICE 2 (2003). 
22 Id.; KHAHIL G. MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, 
CRIME, AND THE MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA (2010); SAIDIYA 
HARTMAN, LOSE YOUR MOTHER: A JOURNEY ALONG THE ATLANTIC SLAVE 
ROUTE (2007). 
23 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
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They are not included, and were not intended to be 
included, under the word ‘citizens’ in the 
Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the 
rights and privileges which that instrument provides 
for and secures to citizens of the United States. On 
the contrary, they were at that time considered as a 
subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had 
been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether 
emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their 
authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as 
those who held the power and the Government might 
choose to grant them..24 
 
Given the harsh judicial pronouncements here – never over-
ruled – the legal status of African Americans remains in many 
respects, the after-life of the slave, still subject to stiff neo-slave 
forms of total legal social control, i.e. convict lease and the prison 
industrial complex,, despite Constitutional Amendments, Federal 
Civil Rights legislation, and executive measures.  
 
PART III. WHITE SUPREMACY, ANTI-BLACKNESS 
AND THE AFTERLIFE OF SLAVERY IN THE LAW 
 
In the post -bellum era, the stain of slavery has been 
impossible to remove. Constitutional Amendments, Supreme Court 
rulings, and legislation notwithstanding, the exploitation of 
captive/caged Black labor continues, largely uninterrupted. As 
Dillon observes: 
Slavery’s production of social and biological death did not 
end with emancipation, did not cease with the end of segregation, and 
refused to heed under civil rights legislation. Its logic and power 
                                                 
24 Id. 
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exceeds the realm of law. The past comes back not just to haunt, but 
to structure and drive the contemporary operations of power.25 
The primary mechanism for the perpetual denial of full 
citizenship has been the criminal law, with its attendant systems of 
policing and punishment. As Frederick Douglas observed nearly 150 
years ago, there is no escaping “the general disposition in this country 
to impute crime to color.”26 Post slavery, the criminalizing narrative 
has been a central cultural feature of on-going efforts at oppression; 
from convict lease/plantain prison farms to the contemporary prison 
industrial complex, the control of black bodies for profit has been 
furthered by the criminal justice system. 
A substantial body of work documents the post -bellum 
transformation of Black Codes into Slave Codes, slave patrols into 
police forces, plantations into prisons, and, in to post-Civil Rights 
era, into the contemporary prison industrial complex.27 At no point 
was the law able to stop this; to the contrary, the law and its 
enforcement apparatus remain consistent, albeit shifting, 
centerpieces of white supremacy and anti-Blackness. 
 
A. THE POST -BELLUM ERA: CONVICT LEASE 
AND PLANATION PRISONS 
 
In the aftermath of the Civil War, the passage of the 13th, 14th, 
and 15th Amendments seemed to promise an end the abolition of 
slavery, due process and equal protection at both state and federal 
levels, and full citizenship via the franchise (at least for Black men). 
Angela Y. Davis, in Are Prisons Obsolete?, traces the initial 
rise of the penitentiary system to the abolition of slavery; “[I]n the 
immediate aftermath of slavery, the southern states hastened to 
develop a criminal justice system that could legally restrict the 
                                                 
25 Stephen Dillon, Possessed by Death: The Neoliberal- Carceral State, Black 
Feminism, and the Afterlife of Slavery, 112RADICAL HIST. REV. 113 (2012). 
26 Douglass, supra note 16. 
27 ANGELA DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? (2003); Angela Davis, Masked 
Racism: Reflections on the Prison Industrial Complex, COLORLINES (Sept. 10, 
1998). 
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possibilities of freedom for the newly released slaves.”28  There was 
a subsequent transformation of the Slave Codes into the Black Codes 
and the plantations into prisons.  Southern states quickly passed laws 
that echoed the restrictions associated with slavery, re-inscribed the 
property interests of “whiteness,” and criminalized a range of 
activities of the perpetrator was black.29 These laws were enforced 
by former slave patrols turned police agencies, with the assistance of 
extra-legal militias, and the white citizenry in general, who are 
merely protected by these same police, but per Wilderson “not 
simply “protected” by the police, they are — in their very 
corporeality — the police.”30 
All this becomes possible because the 13th Amendment – 
“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist in the United 
States” – contained a dangerous loophole- “except as a punishment 
for crime.” This allowed for the conversion of the old plantations to 
penitentiaries – the 18,000 acre Louisiana Penitentiary at Angola is a 
case in point – and the creation of prison “farms” such as Parchmann 
in Mississippi and the infamous Tucker Prison Farm and Cummins 
Prison Farm in Arkansas.31 Sheriffs, jailors and wardens leased out 
entire prisons to private contractors who literally worked thousands 
of prisoners to death in labor camps, on chain gangs, and in prison 
farms. These prisoners were largely black; in the post-Civil War 
South the racial composition of prison and jail populations shifted 
dramatically from majority White to majority Black, and in many 
states increased ten-fold.32  As Davis notes, “the expansion of the 
convict lease system and the county chain gang meant that the 
antebellum criminal justice system, defined criminal justice largely 
as a means for controlling black labor.”33 
                                                 
28 Davis, supra note 27; W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN 
SLAVE-TRADE TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1638 – 1870 (1896). 
29 Id. 
30 Wilderson, supra note 21. 
31 DOUGLAS BLACKMUN, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME, THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF 
BLACK PEOPLE IN AMERICA FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (2008). 
32 Id. 
33 DAVIS, supra note 27. 
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The re-institutionalization of slavery via the criminal legal 
system also served to effectively undo the newly acquired 15th 
Amendment right to vote. This was legislatively curtailed by the 
tailoring of felony disenfranchisement laws to include crimes that 
were supposedly more frequently committed by blacks. In the post- 
Civil War period, existing felony disenfranchisement laws were 
expanded dramatically, especially in the South, and modified to 
include even minor offenses. This legislation, in combination with 
literacy tests, poll taxes, grandfather clauses and ultimately, the threat 
of white terror, essentially denied Blacks the right to vote until the 
mid-twentieth century. 
The 14th Amendment’s promise of due process and equal 
protection was insufficient to override this continued economic 
exploitation and civic exclusion. This was due to a series of Supreme 
Court rulings that interpreted the 14th in support of state’s rights, 
white supremacy, and against Black inclusion. In United States v. 
Cruikshank (1876), the Supreme Court ruled that that “The 
fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from depriving any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; but this adds 
nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another.” 34This 
decision, in a case involving the bloody Colfax Massacre, forbade 
the Federal Government from relying on the Enforcement Act of 
1870 to prosecute actions by white paramilitary groups that had been 
violently suppressing the Black vote. 35 This decision paved the way 
for nearly a century of unchecked white extra-legal violence and 
lynching that served to enforce white supremacy in both law and 
practice. 
On matters of racial equality, the most famous Supreme Court 
ruling of the era was Plessy v. Ferguson (1896).36 Post slavery, white 
supremacy in the law was accomplished by the introduction of a 
series of segregationist Jim Crow laws that mandated Black 
exclusion from white spaces, even in public accommodations. In a 
challenge to legalized segregation of public transportation in the state 
                                                 
34 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876). 
35 Id. 
36 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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of Louisiana, Plessy argues that these laws have denied him equality 
before the law. The majority disagrees and sets forth the principle of 
“separate but equal.” Justice Brown (1896) writes for the majority, 
 
It is claimed by the plaintiff in error that, in an mixed 
community, the reputation of belonging to the 
dominant race, in this instance the white race, is 
‘property,’ in the same sense that a right of action or 
of inheritance is property. . . We are unable to see 
how this statute deprives him of, or in any way 
affects his right to, such property. If he be a white 
man, and assigned to a colored coach, he may have 
his action for damages against the company for being 
deprived of his so-called ‘property.’ Upon the other 
hand, if he be a colored man, and be so assigned, he 
has been deprived of no property, since he is not 
lawfully entitled to the reputation of being a white 
man.37 
 
The sole dissenter in Plessy sets up the juxtaposition between 
Jim Crow and color-blindness that frames the contemporary debate 
on race today.  Justice Harlan, while acknowledging the reality of 
white supremacy, decries its support with the law, but with cold 
comfort: 
 
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race 
in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in 
achievements, in education, in wealth, and in power. 
So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if 
it remains true to its great heritage, and holds fast to 
the principles of constitutional liberty. But in view of 
the constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this 
country no superior, dominant, ruling class of 
citizens. There is no caste here. Our constitution is 
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes 
                                                 
37 Id. 
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among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens 
are equal before the law.38 
 
Even post-Emancipation, Blacks had no claim to the property 
rights of whiteness, nor full and equal access to rights of citizenship 
that entailed. White supremacy and anti-Blackness persisted in law, 
even in the face of Amendments to the Constitution, which purported 
to undo the same. 
 
B. THE POST-CIVIL RIGHTS ERA, MASS 
INCARCERATION AND “COLOR-BLINDNESS 
 
The Supreme Court ruling in Brown v. the Board of 
Education of Topeka, Kansas (1954) is often used as the benchmark 
for chronicling the start of the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s 
and 1960s.39 The Court’s unanimous rejection of Plessy’s “separate 
but equal” provided a new Federal framework with which to 
challenge Jim Crow segregation on the state and local levels. It 
offered the back drop for the Montgomery bus boycott, the resistance 
in Birmingham, Bloody Sunday, the voter registration drives of 
Freedom Summer, and ultimately, passage of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, The Voting Right Act of 1965, the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 
and the 24th Amendment to the Constitution.40 
While there was hope again that the law itself could be 
pressed into the service of racial equality, those victories now seem 
bittersweet. Bell argues that the Brown decision and the ensuing 
Federal legislation were “silent covenants” of interest-convergence, 
where “perceived self-interest of whites rather than the racial 
injustices suffered by Blacks have been the major motivation in 
racial-remediation policies.” 41 Judge Robert L. Carter, one of the 
attorneys who argued Brown goes further, “. . .the fundamental vice 
was not legally enforced racial segregation itself; this was a mere by-
                                                 
38 Id. 
39 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
40 Bell, supra note 4. 
41 Id. 
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product, a symptom of the greater and more pernicious disease  - 
white supremacy.” 42 Legally supported segregation was uprooted 
without dislodging either white supremacy or anti-Blackness, now 
cloaked in race-neutral rhetoric of “color-blindness”. 
The “color-blind” Constitution and the race-neutral 
requirement of Federal Civil Rights legislation now serves as 
convenient cover for the persistence of institutionalized racism. 
Racially coded but race-neutral rhetoric is widely used in debates 
over welfare reform, affirmative action, and particularly “law and 
order” criminal justice policy;43 in all these cases, the coded racial 
sub-text reads clearly, and the resultant policies, while purportedly 
“race neutral,” have resulted in disproportionate harm to people of 
color, especially African Americans. While race is now widely the 
text/subtext of political debate, systemic racism still remains largely 
absent from either political discourse or policy debates of all sorts, 
including those related to criminal injustice. 
In the Post-Civil Rights Era, there has been a corresponding 
shift from de jure racism codified explicitly into the law and legal 
systems to a de facto racism where people of color, especially 
African Americans, are subject to unequal protection of the laws, 
excessive surveillance, police terror, extreme segregation, a brutal 
and biased death penalty, and neo-slave labor via incarceration all in 
the name of “crime control.”44 “Law and order” criminal justice 
policies are all guided by thinly coded appeals to white fears of high 
crime neighborhoods, “crack epidemics,” gang proliferation, 
                                                 
42 MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL., WHITE-WASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-
BLIND SOCIETY (2005). 
43 See generally, Dorothy E. Roberts, Constructing a Criminal Justice System 
Free of Racial Bias: An Abolitionist Framework, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261 
(2007); KATHRYN RUSSELL-BROWN, THE COLOR OF CRIME (2d ed. 2009); 
DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION AND THE 
MEANING OF LIBERTY (Vintage Books 1997); ANGELA DAVIS, THE ANGELA Y. 
DAVIS READER 61-73 (J. James ed., Blackwell 1998); LOIC WACQUANT, 
PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY 
(Duke Univ. Press 2009). 
44 ROBERTS, supra note 43; RUSSELL-BROWN, supra note 43; DAVIS, supra note 
43. 
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juvenile super – predators, urban unrest, school violence, and more. 
In all these case, the sub-text reads clearly — fear of brown and 
especially Black people. 
As before, law, policing and punishment are central to the on-
going exclusion of Blacks from civic life. Post slavery, the 
criminalizing narrative was a cultural feature of on-going efforts at 
oppression; from convict lease/plantain prison farms to the 
contemporary prison industrial complex the control of black bodies 
for profit has been furthered by the criminal justice system.45 “Slave 
Codes” become Black Codes and now Black Codes become gang 
legislation, three-strikes and the War on Drugs in the persistent 
condemnation of Blackness.46 As before, the criminal legal system is 
the primary mechanism for undoing the promised protections of 
Federal Civil Rights legislation and constitutes again, the major 
affront to the fulfillment of the 13th, 14th and 25th Amendments. 
The United States has the highest incarceration rate in the 
world, with a population of 2.3 million behind bars that constitutes 
25% of the world’s prisoners.47 The increased rate of incarceration 
can be traced to the War on Drugs and the rise of lengthy mandatory 
minimum prison sentences for drug crimes and other felonies. These 
policies have proliferated, not in response to crime rate or any 
empirical data that indicates their effectiveness, due to newfound 
sources of profit for prisons.48 As Brewer and Heitzeg (2008) 
observe: 
 
The prison industrial complex is a self-perpetuating 
machine where the vast profits (e.g. cheap labor, 
private and public supply and construction contracts, 
                                                 
45 Davis, supra note 27. 
46 SAMUEL WALKER, C. SPOHN, & M. DELONE, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACE, 
ETHNICITY AND CRIME IN AMERICA (5th ed. 2012); KHAHIL G. MUHAMMAD, THE 
CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME, AND THE MAKING OF MODERN 
URBAN AMERICA (Harvard Univ. Press 2010), available at 
http://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie.html. 
47 Peter Wagner & Leah Sakala, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie, PRISON 
POLICY INITIATIVE (2014). 
48 Wagner, supra note 47. 
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job creation, continued media profits from 
exaggerated crime reporting and crime/punishment 
as entertainment) and perceived political benefits 
(e.g. reduced unemployment rates, “get tough on 
crime” and public safety rhetoric, funding increases 
for police, and criminal justice system agencies and 
professionals) lead to policies that are additionally 
designed to insure an endless supply of “clients” for 
the criminal justice system (e.g. enhanced police 
presence in poor neighborhoods and communities of 
color; racial profiling; decreased funding for public 
education combined with zero-tolerance policies and 
increased rates of expulsion for students of color; 
increased rates of adult certification for juvenile 
offenders; mandatory minimum and “three-strikes” 
sentencing; draconian conditions of incarceration 
and a reduction of prison services that contribute to 
the likelihood of “recidivism”; “collateral 
consequences”-such as felony disenfranchisement, 
prohibitions on welfare receipt, public housing, gun 
ownership, voting and political participation, 
employment- that nearly guarantee continued 
participation in “crime” and return to the prison 
industrial complex following initial release.)49 
 
The 13th Amendment claim of abolition remains unfulfilled, 
as the neo- slavery of the prison industrial complex becomes the 
current vehicle for controlling Black bodies for political and 
economic gain. The trend towards mass incarceration is marred by 
racial disparity. While 1 in 35 adults is under correctional supervision 
and 1 in every 100 adults is in prison, 1 in every 36 Latino adults , 1 
in every 15 black men, 1 in every 100 black women, and 1 in 9 black 
                                                 
49 Rose M. Brewer & Nancy A. Heitzeg, The Racialization of Crime and 
Punishment: Criminal-Justice, Color-blind Racism and the Political Economy of 
the Prison Industrial Complex, 51 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 625, (Dec. 
12, 2007), available at http://abs.sagepub.com/content/51/5/625. 
36.1 ANTI-BLACKNESS, AND THE LIMITS OF THE LAW 69 
men ages 20 to 34 are incarcerated.50  Despite no statistical 
differences in rates of offending, approximately 50% of all prisoners 
are black, 30% are white, and 20% are Latino;.51 These disparities 
are indicative of differential enforcement practices rather than any 
differences in criminal participation. This is particularly true of drug 
crimes, which account for the bulk of the increased prison 
population. Even though Blacks and whites use and sell drugs at 
comparable rates, African Americans are anywhere from 3 to 10 
times more likely to be arrested, and additionally likely to receive 
harsher sentences than their white counterparts.52 
It is no mistake that the subtitle of Michelle Alexander’s epic 
indictment of The New Jim Crow is this: Mass Incarceration in the 
Age of Color-blindness 53 The Drug War, from start to finish, has 
always been racist: draconian sentences, crack versus powder 
disparities, police patrol patterns, stop/frisk practices, racial profiling 
and death at the hands of law enforcement, arrests, convictions, 
sentencing including death and incarceration, and collateral 
consequences that include bans on voting, bars to employment, 
education, housing and economic assistance, and the diminishment 
of parental rights, all fall heaviest on Blacks.54 This racial disparity 
is by design. As Alexander observes criminal justice policies serve 
to regulate and segregate communities of color in the Post-Civil 
Rights era: 
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What has changed since the collapse of Jim Crow has less to 
do with the basic structure of our society than with the language we 
use to justify it. In the era of colorblindness, it is no longer socially 
permissible to use race, explicitly, as a justification for 
discrimination, exclusion, and social contempt. So we don’t. Rather 
than rely on race, we use our criminal justice system to label people 
of color “criminals” and then engage in all the practices we 
supposedly left behind. Today it is perfectly legal to discriminate 
against criminals in nearly all the ways that it was once legal to 
discriminate against African Americans. Once you’re labeled a felon, 
the old forms of discrimination—employment discrimination, 
housing discrimination, denial of the right to vote, denial of 
educational opportunity, denial of food stamps and other public 
benefits, and exclusion from jury service—are suddenly legal. As a 
criminal you have scarcely more rights, and arguably less respect, 
than a black man living in Alabama at the height of Jim Crow. We 
have not ended racial caste in America; we have merely redesigned 
it.55 
We are still not saved by the 14th Amendment.  In the Post-
Civil Rights Era, the Supreme Court has followed the color-blind 
logic of the sole dissenter in Plessy and solidified the race-neutral 
implications of Federal Civil Rights legislation. Color-blindness as 
the new legal doctrine begins to emerge – despite judicial dissent – 
in cases involving affirmative action and other remedied to centuries 
of racial inequality. The Supreme Court adopts the color-blind model 
in The Board of Regents, University of California v. Bakke (1978), 
where the ruling is in favor of a white student who claimed racial 
discrimination in his denial of admission to medical school.56  If the 
Constitution is to be color-blind, race can only be considered with 
“strict scrutiny,” even as a remedy for past discrimination. Justices 
Brennan and Marshall, in separate dissents, point out the flaws of this 
approach. Brennan observes, 
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Claims that law must be “color-blind” or that the 
datum of race is no longer relevant to public policy 
must be seen as aspiration rather than as description 
of reality. . . for reality rebukes us that race has too 
often been used by those who would stigmatize and 
oppress minorities. Yet we cannot . . . let color 
blindness become myopia which masks the reality 
that many “created equal” have been treated within 
our lifetimes as inferior both by the law and by their 
fellow citizens.” 57 
 
Justice Marshall’s dissent echoes the warning, one that has 
now come to pass; 
 
For it must be remembered that, during most of the 
past 200 years, the Constitution as interpreted by this 
Court did not prohibit the most ingenious and 
pervasive forms of discrimination against the Negro. 
Now, when a state acts to remedy the effects of that 
legacy of discrimination, I cannot believe that this 
same Constitution stands as a barrier. 58 
 
McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) is perhaps the most significant 
case of the Post-Civil Rights era with respect to the application of the 
14th Amendment as to matter of race.59 It is here that potential for an 
interpretation that would allow for real remedies for institutionalized 
discrimination is presented and denied. The racial disparity that 
characterizes all criminal justice has been most obvious and 
contested in the application of capital punishment, especially in the 
South, where the “killing state” stepped to do what was once the work 
of extra-legal lynch mobs.60 After a series of death penalty cases 
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where the Court ruled that racial discrimination in the application of 
the criminal laws’ ultimate penalty must be addressed, it is here that 
the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision clearly defines discrimination as 
individual not institutionalized. Citing statistical evidence from the 
now famous Baldus study, McCleskey argued that the application of 
the death penalty in Georgia was fraught with systemic patterns of 
racism that transcended but tainted any particular case. Defendants 
charged with killing white victims were more likely to receive the 
death penalty, and, in fact, cases involving black defendants and 
white victims were more likely to result in a sentence of death than 
cases involving any other racial combination.61 The majority did not 
dispute the statistical evidence, but feared the consequences. If the 
Court accepted McCleskey’s claim, then the Equal Protection Clause 
of the 14th Amendment would apply to patterns of discrimination, to 
institutionalized racism and sexism, to questions of structured 
inequality. It could, in fact, be used to challenge the very foundations 
of the criminal justice system itself, start to finish: laws with 
disproportionate racial impact, racial profiling and racial bias in 
police use of force, and prosecutorial discretion. These fears are 
expressed in Powell’s opinion for the majority, 
 
“First, McCleskey’s claim, taken to its logical 
conclusion, throws into serious question the 
principles that underlie our entire criminal justice 
system. The Eighth Amendment is not limited in 
application to capital punishment, but applies to all 
penalties. Thus, if we accepted McCleskey’s claim 
that racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital 
sentencing decision, we could soon be faced with 
similar claims as to other types of penalty. Moreover, 
the claim that his sentence rests on the irrelevant 
factor of race easily could be extended to apply to 
claims based on unexplained discrepancies that 
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correlate to membership in other minority groups, 
and even to gender.62 
 
In the majority’s view, equal protection of the laws was for 
individuals, not oppressed groups, and discrimination must be 
intentional and similarly individual. McCleskey closed off the last 
best avenue for remedying structural inequality with the law itself, 
and preserved the color-blind veneer at the expense of racial remedy. 
Justice Brennan’s impassioned dissent makes the implications of this 
decision clear: 
 
At some point in this case, Warren McCleskey 
doubtless asked his lawyer whether a jury was likely 
to sentence him to die. A candid reply to this question 
would have been disturbing. First, counsel would 
have to tell McCleskey that few of the details of the 
crime or of McCleskey’s past criminal conduct were 
more important than the fact that his victim was 
white. Furthermore, counsel would feel bound to tell 
McCleskey that defendants charged with killing 
white victims in Georgia are 4.3 times as likely to be 
sentenced to death as defendants charged with killing 
blacks. In addition, frankness would compel the 
disclosure that it was more likely than not that the 
race of McCleskey’s victim would determine 
whether he received a death sentence: 6 of every 11 
defendants convicted of killing a white person would 
not have received the death penalty if their victims 
had been black. While, among defendants with 
aggravating and mitigating factors comparable to 
McCleskey’s, 20 of every 34 would not have been 
sentenced to die if their victims had been black. 
Finally, the assessment would not be complete 
without the information that cases involving black 
defendants and white victims are more likely to result 
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in a death sentence than cases featuring any other 
racial combination of defendant and victim. Ibid. The 
story could be told in a variety of ways, but 
McCleskey could not fail to grasp its essential 
narrative line: there was a significant chance that race 
would play a prominent role in determining if he 
lived or died. . . 
 
At the time our Constitution was framed 200 years 
ago this year, blacks had for more than a century 
before been regarded as beings of an inferior order, 
and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, 
either in social or political relations; and so far 
inferior that they had no rights which the white man 
was bound to respect. Only 130 years ago, this Court 
relied on these observations to deny American 
citizenship to blacks. Ibid. A mere three generations 
ago, this Court sanctioned racial segregation, stating 
that “[i]f one race be inferior to the other socially, the 
Constitution of the United States cannot put them 
upon the same plane.” Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 
537, 552 (1896). In more recent times, we have 
sought to free ourselves from the burden of this 
history. Yet it has been scarcely a generation since 
this Court’s first decision striking down racial 
segregation, and barely two decades since the 
legislative prohibition of racial discrimination in 
major domains of national life. These have been 
honorable steps, but we cannot pretend that, in three 
decades, we have completely escaped the grip of a 
historical legacy spanning centuries Warren 
McCleskey’s evidence confronts us with the subtle 
and persistent influence of the past. His message is a 
disturbing one to a society that has formally 
repudiated racism, and a frustrating one to a Nation 
accustomed to regarding its destiny as the product of 
its own will. Nonetheless, we ignore him at our peril, 
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for we remain imprisoned by the past as long as we 
deny its influence in the present. 63 
 
Well into the 21st Century, Supreme Court decisions continue 
to erode Federal Civil Rights legal gains and the ability of the Civil 
War Amendments to provide racial redress. The doctrine of strict 
scrutiny itself continues to be eroded further as the current Supreme 
Court limits its application and as a series of subsequent cases from 
Grutter v Bollinger (2003) and Gratz v. Bollinger (2003) to Fisher v. 
University of Texas at Austin (2014) and Shelby County v. Holder 
(2012) have shown, the Constitution has indeed erected a legal 
barrier with claims of colorblindness.64 Worse still, as Crenshaw 
notes, the shift even beyond color-blindness towards claims of “post-
racial pragmatism,” 
 
This pragmatism jettisons the liberal ambivalence 
about race consciousness to embrace a colorblind 
stance even as it foregrounds and celebrates the 
achievement of particular racial outcomes. In the 
new post-racial moment, the pragmatist may be 
agnostic about the conservative erasure of race as a 
contemporary phenomenon but may still march 
under the same premise that significant progress can 
be made without race consciousness. . .. 
 
Colorblindness as doctrine not only undermines litigation 
strategies that rely on race-conscious remediation, but it also soothes 
social anxiety about whether deeper levels of social criticism, 
remediation, and reconstruction might be warranted. While 
colorblindness declared racism as a closed chapter in our history, 
post-racialism now provides reassurance to those who weren’t fully 
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convinced that this history had ceased to cast its long shadow over 
contemporary affairs. Post-racialism offers a gentler escape, an 
appeal to the possibility that racial power can be side stepped, 
finessed and ultimately overcome by regarding dominance as merely 
circumstance that need not get in the way of social progress. 
As post-racialism becomes the vehicle for a colorblind 
agenda, the material consequences of racial exploitation and social 
violence— including the persistence of educational inequity, the 
disproportionate racial patterns of criminalization and incarceration, 
and the deepening patterns of economic stratification—slide further 
into obscurity.65 
More than a century after the Civil War Amendments, 60 
years since Brown, 50 years since the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 
we are here, with white supremacy and anti-Blackness intact, but 
now masked, and with slavery (unwilling to die) transformed yet 
again. Still, the law, unwilling and unable to offer relief, but worse 
still, at the center of this exclusionary endeavor, from the outset to 
the present, remains the definer and purveyor of Black social, civil 
and literal death. 
 
PART VI. REMEDIES? 
 
Despite centuries of death-defying movements and oft well-
intended legislation, the essential story line and structural reality of 
white supremacy/anti-Blackness remains foundationally intact. 
While there has been progress for some, enough to reinforce the 
claims of a post-racial era, the mainstay, the historical sway of a 
slavery rooted in both racism and profit, lingers, transformed over 
and again from “the prison of slavery to the slavery of prison.”66  This 
same phenomena is called by many names. All the powers of the law 
- Constitutional amendments, Federal Civil Rights legislation, 
Supreme Court rulings - have failed to stymie this trend, and as we 
have seen, have often allowed and re-enforced the same. 
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In the Post-Civil Rights era, efforts to resist are complicated 
by the insidious cover story created by the paradigm of “color-blind” 
racism and its corresponding entrenchment in now “race-neutral” 
law. All matter of inequality is masked by claims of legal equality, 
but nowhere more so than with regard to the extensive and excessive 
reliance on mass incarceration.67 Criminality has become conflated 
nearly entirely with Blackness, and the entire machinery of it rests on 
an unspoken understanding that the property rights of “whiteness” 
rest now (as always) on the exclusion, the caging, and the execution 
of Black bodies. The law supports this, still. 
In light of this, what remedies then remain? The usual calls 
for still more legal reform, perhaps for reparations, the hope for a 
more radical future Supreme Court reading of McCleskey seem too 
distant, too abstract, and perhaps too, destined to fail at addressing 
the deep roots of the possessive investment in slavery.68 Perhaps the 
most fruitful approach is evidenced in the prison abolition 
movement, which explicitly recognizes the contemporary prison 
industrial complex as an extension of slavery and later, convict 
lease.69 As such, the call now, as then, must be for abolition. Angela 
Davis describes the movement as follows: 
 
Prison abolition, like the abolition of slavery, is a 
long-range goal and the handbook argues that an 
abolitionist approach requires an analysis of “crime” 
that links it with social structures, as opposed to 
individual pathology, as well as “anticrime” 
strategies that focus on the provision of social 
resources. Of course, there are many versions of 
prison abolitionism—including those that propose to 
abolish punishment altogether and replace it with 
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reconciliatory responses to criminal acts. In my 
opinion, the most powerful relevance of abolitionist 
theory and practice today resides in the fact that 
without a radical position vis-a-vis the rapidly 
expanding prison system, prison architecture, prison 
surveillance, and prison system corporatization, 
prison culture, with all its racist and totalitarian 
implications, will continue not only to claim ever 
increasing numbers of people of color, but also to 
shape social relations more generally in our society. 
Prison needs to be abolished as the dominant mode 
of addressing social problems that are better solved 
by other institutions and other means. The call for 
prison abolition urges us to imagine and strive for a 
very different social landscape.70 
 
Even here, there is the danger that the prison abolition 
movement will attend to the dismantling of an essential structure of 
white supremacy without fully grappling at root with the anti-
Blackness that serves as corollary. At the time of this writing, the 
nation is divided again for the most recent in an ongoing spate of 
“new 21st century version of lynchings”.71 Police and vigilante 
killings of unarmed Blacks, now occur at the rate of 1 every 28 
hours.72 New research verifies what some have already known with 
their lives, that Black children are seen, by police and others, as older 
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by far— in fact not seen as children as all.73 New research too 
suggests that white Americans are more comfortable with punitive 
and harsh policing and sentencing when they imagine that the people 
being policed and put in prison are black. This is mediated by fear; 
the idea of black criminals inspires higher anxiety than that of white 
criminals, pressing white people to want stronger law enforce 
enforcement.74 While these sentiments and actions are rooted in the 
desire to protect the property of “whiteness,’ this is always over and 
against the perceived intrusion of excluded Blackness. 
In the final analysis, it is the long shadow of anti-Blackness 
that must be confronted. All legal, political, and social movement 
efforts to dismantle white supremacist institutions will fail in lieu of 
this. These will be half measures until, at last, there is 
acknowledgement and embrace of the “Black specter waiting in the 
wings. . . .that cannot be satisfied (via reform or reparation), but must 
nonetheless be pursued to the death.”75 
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